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European banking after the Euro: Progress and problems 
William Templeton  
Robert Clark 
The introduction of the euro has presented the European banking industry with an opportunity to examine 
its structure and address its fragmentation. The leaders in European banking will evolve as the efficiencies 
in a single currency are realized. This article discusses the changes in European banking since the 
introduction of the euro, providing statistics on mergers and acquisitions and their effects on assets both 
inside and outside the eurozone. It considers the factors which make cross-border mergers less attractive, 
the effect of consolidation on costs, and the impact of the euro on foreign exchange earnings, debt 
markets and cash management systems. It concludes that although banks are becoming more competitive 
with each other and with other financial services companies, national barriers to further integration of the 
financial services market remain. 
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In their earlier article for this journal Templeton and Bond (1999) viewed the introduction of the 
Euro and the emergence of a single financial market as having important consequences for business 
strategies and structure of European banking. Keener competition across borders would result in 
consolidation of the industry, along with reduced costs of operations and new products and 
services.  
The present study extends that analysis to determine to what extent changes have actually occurred 
in the structure and operations of euroland banking since the advent of the Euro. It finds some 
progress in the development of a Europe-wide financial services market. The advent of the euro 
and the continued growth of the Internet have indeed facilitated consolidations and created new 
products and services. Yet, for many banks cost savings and synergies remain elusive goals. 
Moreover, some legal and political barriers continue to frustrate efforts for more cross-border 
financial business.  
Competition and Consolidation  
The introduction of the euro has presented the European banking industry with an opportunity to 
examine its structure and address its fragmentation. The introduction of the single currency has 
served as a catalyst for consolidation. In a recent press conference European Central Bank 
chairman Duisenberg went on record to state that:  
The (ECB) Governing Council is well aware that the current process of consolidation is no longer 
confined to small and medium-sized banks - as it was in the past - but that now it also covers the 
larger banks at the national level and cross-border mergers and alliances are on the increase. The 
role of the Euro as a factor encouraging this process of consolidation via further integration of 
money and capital markets is important. The consolidation process is welcome in general since it 
allows efficiency gains to be achieved in the banking sector. On the other hand, it affects the 
competitive environment in which banks operate, as well as their risk profile.1  
The European banking industry has certainly taken his words to heart. Table 1 presents an 
overview of significant Eurozone bank mergers and acquisitions since the start of 1999. The 
transactions illustrate the growing global consolidation of the financial services industry as 
European and US based institutions seek opportunities to extend franchises. Note that this 
consolidation has occurred mainly within national borders.  
The consolidation process has certainly facilitated the growth of major Eurozone banks. Table 2 
lists the ten largest Eurozone and non-Eurozone banks by size of assets for 1998 and 1999. They 
are ranked by asset size. Note that average size of Eurozone bank assets rose 20.5 percent following 
the introduction of the Euro. In contrast, non-Eurozone bank assets grew only 2 percent over the 
like period!  
The leaders in European banking will continue to evolve as the efficiencies in a single currency 
are realized. They recognize the need for a global presence. Competition is taking precedence over 
cartelization.  
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As both of the above tables reveal, however, the nature of the consolidation movement has been 
primarily domestic, not the cross-border activity envisioned by a single financial market. The 1999 
ABN Amro Annual Report states:  
The acceleration in the development of the single market has lowered entry thresholds and forced 
European banks to redefine their traditional home markets. Consolidation in Europe has so far 
largely remained a domestic affair. Mergers and acquisitions within a country generally provide 
the most scope for cost reduction. In larger countries such as Germany, France and Italy, the 
financial sector is still less concentrated than in smaller countries and local banks still have scope 
for consolidation at national level. There have been some cross-border takeovers, mainly in smaller 
countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium where the financial sector is already so highly 
concentrated that opportunities for consolidation at the national level have almost vanished. In 
practice, however, cross-border consolidation is often still impeded by the urge to protect national 
interests. Governments of some European Union member states attach great significance to the 
development of national champions capable of competing at European and global levels with other 
major players. Banks are therefore forced initially to take minority stakes in foreign banks, with a 
view to completing full mergers or takeovers in the future.3  
Apparently, old habits die hard. Fiona Haddock (2000) notes that it is one thing to see a major 
clothing company acquired by a foreign investor. It is a different thing to see a major bank being 
sold to an outsider. When Spanish giant Banco Santander Central Hispano made a bid for a 40% 
stake in Mundial Confianca, Portugal's third largest financial group, the government responded 
swiftly and defensively, favouring the country's own Banco Commercial Portugues. A tussle 
between Banque Nationale de Paris, Societe Generale, and Paribas had economic nationalism at 
its core. The French government ignored advances by foreign players, determined to see a strong 
French bank emerge victorious.  
Nevertheless, some cross-border alliances are being made. In 1999, for example, Commerzbank 
invested el.2 billion in 1999 in three geographically diverse financial services/banking firms.  
The dramatic transition in the European Banking sector is also evident in the variety of alliances 
that have been formed outside of the traditional banking industries. Bancassurance, in which a 
bank joins with an insurer, has gained favour as a way of cross selling (Haddock, 2000). The 
changing competitive environment is also illustrated by Deutsche Bank's alliance with 
Mannesmann AG to support an E-commerce initiative to offer online banking services. Also, after 
its purchase of US life insurer ReliaStar for $6.1 billion and its announced intention to acquire US 
Aetna Financial Services for $7.7 billion, ING will be first in US life and annuity premiums and 
up to 11th from its 19th position in terms of global asset managers. It will have the biggest 
broker/dealer network in the US and be sixth in assets under management at $111 billion.  
Cost Structures in the Banking Industry  
Certainly a major reason behind the merger movement is the potential for cost savings. But are 
they being attained? The evidence suggests that in the short run the benefits are limited. Banks 
have typically overestimated their synergies. In fact some banks have even experienced increased 
costs associated with the introduction of the Euro. Commerzbank (1999) has reported that overall 
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operating expenses rose a significant 23.9% in 1999. It cites the Euro as a major reason for 
increased costs.4 For DG Bank the overall costs of the switch to the Euro were around DM 100 
million.5 Rabobank notes that "...estimates on the cost of implementing the single currency are 
expected to amount to around Fl.300m."6 Credit Lyonnais attributes a 2.1% rise in expenses as 
being chiefly due to Euro and year 2000 related costs.  
In addition to the costs of preparing their systems for the Euro banks face significant expenses in 
the actual distribution and handling of new notes and coins scheduled for introduction in January 
2002. The European Central Bank forecasts the number of Euro bank notes, which need to be 
printed before the launch date of Jan 1, 2002 is for 14.5 billion in notes, compared with last year's 
estimate of 13 billion.  
Among other major barriers to achieving cost efficiencies are strong unions and strict labour laws 
in many continental European countries. When banks do merge there is little room to cut staff. 
Haddock (2000) quotes Gary Jenkins of Barclays Capital:  
If you have two large branch-based networks in the United Kingdom with a lot of overlapping, 
you would see a lot of people potentially out of work. In Europe it is more a matter of not hiring 
too many new people and letting people go as they reach retirement age. It takes time for that to 
happen. In Germany and France, it is difficult to be aggressive about staff numbers in the same 
way as in the United States or the United Kingdom. As a result the economies of scale in 
continental Europe banking mergers is not being realized.  
This is largely why UK banks have avoided cross-border mergers. They are already more 
consolidated and efficient and enjoy significantly higher returns than Continental banks. Lloyds-
TSB, in particular, boasts a remarkably high return on equity of 30%. Toss in problems involved 
with different cultures and languages, it becomes hard to justify acquisitions of banks in other 
countries, a process, which will inevitably dilute earnings.  
Nevertheless, in the long run, potentials for cost savings do exist. At the retail level, as evidenced 
by a Bank of International Settlement report on comparative cost structures for the banking 
European banks have a significantly higher number of branches than their global competition.7 
Eurozone banks have about one branch for every 2000 inhabitants. This figure compares with one 
branch for every 3000 in the United States and one branch for every 5000 residents in Japan. While 
the near term effect of the single currency is to increase operating costs, in the longer term the 
attendant consolidation of the industry offers opportunities to lower costs through the reduction of 
branch offices and the use of more automatic banking machines.  
New Products and Services  
Overcapacity and growing competition from nonbanks for both deposit and lending business has 
led to pressure on interest margins. As foreign exchange earnings have declined banks have 
responded by expanding the range of other financial products and services they offer. As the 1998 
Annual Report of the West Landesbank indicates:  
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Banks are now challenged to align their range of products and services to accommodate the 
changing requirements of their clients, who are increasingly operating on an EMU-wide basis. 
Banks offering comprehensive systems and products at marketable conditions across Europe will 
be best placed to make use of competitive opportunities.8  
Foreign Exchange  
With the introduction of the Euro, industry observers anticipated a decline in foreign exchange 
earnings for European Banks. Although separate reporting of foreign exchange earnings is not 
standard, the financial impact on performance has been cited by a number of institutions in their 
annual reports. Typical is the notation in Commerzbank's 1999 Annual Report: "Foreign exchange 
at 79 million Euros produced less than half the income of the previous year; however, this decline 
was virtually inevitable after the introduction of the Euro and the limited opportunities for trading 
in European currencies which this entailed."9 A Rabobank report cites that, "...the loss of foreign 
exchange business.. is estimated at around fl.70 million per annum."10 The Banks for International 
Settlement reports that:  
In the last two years foreign exchange markets have been affected by significant structural change, 
including the introduction of the Euro, consolidation among market players and the growth of 
electronic banking. These changes have been accompanied by a general reduction in trading 
activity and some rise in exchange rate volatility, although it is still too early to ascertain their 
effect on volatility and liquidity.11  
A number of European financial institutions report that their hedging business declined after the 
bilateral exchange rates of prospective EMU members were locked together in May 1998. Overall, 
however, profitability has improved as banks increase their earnings in underwriting/securities 
while their income from foreign exchange transactions has declined. Isolating the effect of the 
Euro introduction on profitability in specific areas has proven a difficult task.  
Ironically, the impact of the introduction of the Euro in global financial markets has been less than 
in the European Foreign Exchange market. The Bank for International Settlements reports:  
"An analysis of spot and forward foreign exchange (FX) trading volumes suggests that the 
introduction of the Euro has not to date caused major changes in FX market activity. Results from 
an informal survey among market participants and information from electronic brokers indicate 
that the importance of the new currency in FX trading roughly matches that of the Duetsche mark 
before 1999. In particular, the reported share of trading in Euros against dollars in October 1999 
was about the same as that of dollar/mark trading in April 1998. Furthermore, the share of Euro/yen 
trading still accounts for only a small part of the total market. In emerging market countries, the 
role of the Euro so far seems similar to that of the mark, being confined mainly to Eastern 
Europe."13  
European Bond Market  
Historically, European firms have depended upon syndicated bank loans for financing, rather than 
using the securities markets to issue equity shares or debt. Such financing is still the preferred way 
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to find European mergers and acquisitions. However, Wolswijk (2000) has found that the process 
of disintermediation, whereby companies rely less on bank credit and more on the public market 
has accelerated. In addition, the consolidation in European banking has increased the demand from 
borrowers for debt denominated in Euros. Subsequent to the introduction of the Euro, the 
currency's share of international bond issues increased from 35% in 1998 to 45% in 1999. The 
West Landesbank Annual Report cites:  
The commencement of EMU has given rise to the world's second-largest bond market with a 
volume of some e3.8 trillion. Accounting for over 60% of the market, government bonds will 
continue to dominate. The euro bond market will, however, form a broad range of investments 
involving issuers of different sizes and credit standing. Among other things, this will be spurred 
by mounting demand on the part of institutional investors such as insurance companies and pension 
funds, which are gaining an importance due to the on-going "institutionalization" of saving."14  
As corporate borrowing preferences change from syndicated loans to credit markets, the transition 
in European banking has encouraged the development of new products and services that add 
underwriting to bank services. However, the European institutions have encountered significant 
global competition from US institutions. This competition has encouraged the consolidation of the 
industry beyond the domestic or even European wide markets. This need for consolidation became 
evident in Deutsche Bank's acquisition of US-based Bankers Trust. Shearlock (1999) notes that 
despite the competition, through October 1999 the three leading German banks, plus ABN Amro 
and Paribas, together ran the books on more than a third of all Euro-denominated bond issues.  
Throughout 1999 the European debt markets continued to evolve as barriers declined. For 
example, legal barriers to the issue of commercial paper that existed in Germany have been lifted. 
In addition to the development of a commercial paper market the European corporate debt market 
has expanded to include high-yield bonds and derivative products.  
Analyzing actual income from securities underwriting for European banks is difficult due to 
differences in accounting standards. For example, under German accounting rules, banks have a 
variety of opportunities to defer tax on start-up assets, write down future losses and net off costs 
against revenues. Thus, it is difficult to determine the impact of the shift in lending practices on a 
bank's profits. Nevertheless, for the leading European banks reporting, net commission income 
increased 22.6 percent from 1998 to 1999. This increase appears to be primarily the result of 
securities transactions and asset management.  
Cash and Asset Management  
The introduction of the Euro had been expected to increase the demand for cash management 
services by European banks for corporate customers. Indeed, as cross-border barriers have fallen 
banks have recognized the need to develop more integrated cash management systems that operate 
across borders. The ability to consolidate working capital balances provides corporate treasuries 
with more efficient cost management. The ING Group reports that:  
The introduction of a single currency has further enhanced the importance of international funds 
transfer and optimal cash management. `With the Euro Navigator, we assist our corporate clients 
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in their European funds transfer and in their cash flows throughout Europe in the most efficient 
way,' says Hans van der Noordaa, who was the first general manager of International Cash 
Management."  
The market consolidation climate has led corporate customers to seek cash management accounts 
that deliver increased efficiency. Negative balances in one Eurozone country can be consolidated 
and balanced against the positive balances in other countries improving cash management and 
liquidity. European banks have developed European cash management systems to take advantage 
of technological advances and regulatory changes accompanying the introduction of a single 
currency.  
As European cross-border transactions have increased, banking services dealing with asset 
management have also changed. The development of a continent wide investment focus has 
spawned a significant increase in assets under management. Thus, the distinctions between 
commercial and investment banks are becoming less clear.  
Currently, it is estimated that global custodians have custody of e3,000 billion in assets for 
European mutual funds. This amount is expected to rise to e8,000 billion by 2005. Some $90 
billion went into European equity funds in 1999, marking a 32-percent increase. European 
financial institutions are responding to the changes in the fund management business. Investment 
banks and insurance companies manage over three-quarters of institutional funds under 
management. The development of this business has provided European banks with new 
opportunities. ING reports that assets under management for third parties increased 50 percent in 
1999 with mutual fund assets increasing 63 percent. ABN Amro Mellon has picked up contracts 
to run multinational pension schemes. The exact impact of the asset management business is 
difficult to determine due to the lack of separate financial reporting. However, Deutsche Bank 
notes that 20 percent of the group's net profit in the first half of 1999 came from asset management 
services. Fee generation was a critical issue behind the announcement of UBS's plan to purchase 
Paine Webber for $10.8 billion.16  
What's Next?  
It is clear that the Eurozone banking industry has made some progress in the past two years. Banks 
have merged and acquired, restructured and rationalized their industry. They are becoming 
competitive, not only among themselves, but with non-bank financial services companies.  
But the benefits of cross-border mergers and attendant cost savings will not be fully realized until 
the European market for financial services is more integrated than it is today. The problem remains 
protectionism - a fear that once the floodgates are open US and British bankers will dominate 
financial services. Turf wars abound, both within the European Commission and among the 
member nations. The enemy is the time it takes to draw up and refine European legislation, or 
promote a common code of conduct, and then enforce it.  
Shireff (1999) finds that it is still not possible to have a pan-European bank account. Retail bank 
charges for intereuro business remain excessive. Conversions average 5%, while cross-border 
transfers cost 8.4%.  
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ABN-Amro has been trying for years to establish a bank account usable across Europe. The 
problem is a legal and political one, not a technical one. Spokesman Jaap Kamp, head of ABN's 
European Union office in Brussels, notes that "Registering is difficult, there are different reporting 
requirements, there are different set-off and bankruptcy laws and solvency ratios. This sort of thing 
was not discussed when Europe went headlong into monetary union."  
Wholesale markets are also trapped behind national barriers. Legal obstacles remain before this 
business becomes freely cross border. Agreement must be reached on such matters as title to 
collateral, bankruptcy and set-off, variations in takeover codes.  
The European Union, through its Directorate-General for Internal Market and Financial Affairs 
has sought to deal with these problems. In 1999 it launched its programme "Financial Services: 
Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets Action Plan." The director, however, had to 
admit that progress on market liberalization was being held hostage by another committee seeking 
progress on tax coordination. Horse-trading and politics are still strong factors in the administrative 
process.  
EU directives can be difficult to negotiate, but they represent a long-term solution to 
harmonization. UK representatives are playing a role in shaping these rules. But administrative 
wheels grind slowly. UK bankers may not be remiss to take a "wait and see" attitude before taking 
the plunge into cross-border activities. The advent of the Euro has catalyzed the ongoing trend 
towards financial sector consolidation, but has yet to transform its mainly domestic character.  
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